OPPOSITION No B 1 283 367

Brooks Brothers Group, Inc., 100 Phoenix Avenue, 06082, Enfield, United States of America (opponent), represented by Baker & McKenzie LLP, 100 New Bridge Street, EC4V 6JA London, United Kingdom (professional representative)

a g a i n s t

Brooks England Ltd, Downing Street, Smethwick, B66 2PA West Midlands, United Kingdom (applicant), represented by Avvocati Associati Feltrinelli & Brogi, Corso Palladio 54, 36100 Vicenza, Italy (professional representative).

On 21/11/2019, the Opposition Division takes the following

DECISION:

1. Opposition No B 1 283 367 is upheld for all the contested goods.

2. European Union trade mark application No 5 786 603 is rejected in its entirety.

3. The applicant bears the costs, fixed at EUR 650.

REASONS

The opponent filed an opposition against all the goods of European Union trade mark application No 5 786 603 for the word mark ‘BROOKS BIKE WEAR’. Following the limitation of the scope of the opposition by the opponent (observations of 17/12/2018), the opposition remains based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR invoked in relation to European Union trade mark registrations No 11 103 421 for the word mark ‘BROOKS BROTHERS COUNTRY CLUB’ and No 1 210 517 for the word mark ‘BROOKS BASICS’ and international trade mark registration No 893 183 designating the European Union for the word mark ‘BROOKS BROTHERS’.

Ownership of the earlier marks

Ownership of the earlier marks has changed during the opposition proceedings and this change has been recorded in the appropriate trade mark registers. Consequently, the new owner of the opposing marks, Brooks Brothers Group, Inc., replaces the previous owner as the opponent in the current proceedings.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION — ARTICLE 8(1)(b) EUTMR

A likelihood of confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. Whether a likelihood of confusion exists depends on the appreciation in a global assessment of several factors, which are interdependent. These factors include the similarity of the signs, the similarity of the goods and services, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the distinctive and dominant elements of the conflicting signs, and the relevant public.

The opposition is based on more than one earlier trade mark. The Opposition Division finds it appropriate to first examine the opposition in relation to the opponent’s international trade mark registration No 893 183 designating the European Union.

1. The goods

The goods on which the opposition is based are, inter alia, the following:

Class 9: Eyeglasses, comprising spectacles, spectacle frames, sunglasses, eyeglass chains, eyeglass retaining bands, eyeglass cases and lens; binoculars, tape measures and pedometers, calculators, electronic calendars, barometers; electric or battery operated travel irons, voltage conversion devices.

Class 18: Handbags, tote bags, backpacks, luggage, wallets, purses, key cases, briefcases, duffel bags, all-purpose sport bags, wallets for business card, wallets for credit cards; briefcase-type portfolios, billfolds, tie case, attaché cases; cases and umbrellas.

Class 25: Men’s, women’s, boy’s and girl’s shirts, tops, sweaters, jackets, pants, suits, bottoms, socks, hats and caps; shoes; shorts, coats, neckties, underwear, vests, robes, hosiery, skirts, dresses, loungewear, scarves, rainwear, trousers, ascots, ties, outer shirts including evening, dress, polo and sports shirts, collars, pajamas, robes, smoking jackets, dressing gowns, mufflers, gloves, hoses, belts, suspenders, garters, boots, slippers, shoes, overshoes, beach wear, swimwear, and formal wear, namely jackets, pants, suits, shirts, shoes, cummerbunds, ties, suspenders and gowns.

Class 28: Golf accessories and golf equipment, namely divot tools, ball markers, golf balls, golf clubs, golf bags, golf ball washers, golf tees, and golf club covers.

The contested goods are the following:

Class 9: Protective helmets for cyclists and motorcyclists, spectacles for cyclists and motorcyclists, spectacle cases.

Class 18: Bags, handbags, rucksacks, small rucksacks, waist packs, all for cyclists and motorcyclists.

Class 25: Jackets, shorts, trousers, jerseys, sweatshirts, dungarees, tops, bodysuits, all for cyclists and motorcyclists, clothing accessories for cyclists and motorcyclists in particular socks, shoes, overshoes, peaked caps, visors, clips, underwear for cyclists.

Class 28: Gymnastic and sporting articles not included in other classes, in particular gloves for cyclists and motorcyclists, chest pads for cyclists and motorcyclists, elbow pads and knee pads for cyclists and motorcyclists.

An interpretation of the wording of the list of services is required to determine the scope of protection of these services.

The terms ‘in particular’ and ‘including’, used in the lists of goods, indicate that the specific goods are only examples of items included in the category and that protection is not restricted to them. In other words, they introduce a non-exhaustive list of examples (09/04/2003, T‑224/01, Nu‑Tride, EU:T:2003:107). However, the term ‘namely’, used in the opponent’s list of goods to show the relationship of individual goods to a broader category, is exclusive and restricts the scope of protection only to the goods specifically listed.

It is also to be noted that according to Article 33(7) EUTMR, goods or services are not regarded as being similar to or dissimilar from each other on the ground that they appear in the same or different classes under the Nice Classification.

The relevant factors relating to the comparison of the goods or services include, inter alia, the nature and purpose of the goods or services, the distribution channels, the sales outlets, the producers, the method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or complementary to each other. These factors are known as the ‘Canon criteria’ (29/09/1998, C‑39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442).

Contested goods in Class 9

The contested spectacles for cyclists and motorcyclists are included in the broader category of the opponent’s spectacles. Therefore, they are identical.

The contested spectacle cases are synonymous with the opponent’s eyeglass cases. Therefore, they are identical.

The contested protective helmets for cyclists and motorcyclists are similar to a low degree to the opponent’s vests, jackets, gloves in Class 25. The opponent’s goods cover, among others, vests, jackets and gloves made for cyclists and motorcyclists and, consequently, the goods at issue belong to the same market sector. They are commonly manufactured under the control of the same entity, offered for sale in the same specialised shops or sports departments in stores and satisfy the needs of the same public (see also 10/01/2017, R 719/2016‑4, PIT-STORE (fig.) / PIT STOP, § 33).

Contested goods in Class 18

The contested handbags, all for cyclists and motorcyclists are included in the broader category of the opponent’s handbags. Therefore, they are identical.

The contested bags, all for cyclists and motorcyclists overlap with the opponent’s all-purpose sport bags. Therefore, they are identical.

The contested rucksacks, small rucksacks, all for cyclists and motorcyclists are included in the opponent’s backpacks. Therefore, they are identical.

The contested waist packs, all for cyclists and motorcyclists are similar to the opponent’s handbags, as these goods usually coincide in their producers, relevant public and distribution channels. In addition, they have the same purpose.

Contested goods in Class 25

The contested jackets, shorts, trousers, tops, all for cyclists and motorcyclists are included in the opponent’s jackets, shorts, trousers, tops. Therefore, they are identical.

The remaining contested goods in this class, namely jerseys, sweatshirts, dungarees, bodysuits, all for cyclists and motorcyclists, clothing accessories for cyclists and motorcyclists in particular socks, shoes, overshoes, peaked caps, visors, clips, underwear for cyclists, are at least similar to the opponent’s men’s, women’s, boy’s and girl’s shirts, sweaters, jackets; loungewear, outer shirts. All these goods coincide, at the very least, in their purpose (protection of human body against external conditions and/or fashion). They target the same relevant public and may be produced by the same manufacturers and commercialised by the same channels.

Contested goods in Class 28

The terms ‘chest pads’, ‘elbow pads’ and ‘knee pads’ refer to protective padded gear worn on various parts of human body to protect it against injury during a fall or a strike. As noted above, the term ‘in particular’, used in the applicant’s list, indicates that these goods are only examples of items included in this category.

The contested gymnastic and sporting articles not included in other classes, in particular gloves for cyclists and motorcyclists, chest pads for cyclists and motorcyclists, elbow pads and knee pads for cyclists and motorcyclists are similar to at least a low degree to the opponent’s vests, jackets, gloves in Class 25, which also cover vests, jackets and gloves for cyclists and motorcyclists, as explained above. All of these goods coincide, at the very least, in their producers, relevant public and distribution channels and, therefore, a certain degree of similarity between them is justified.

2. Relevant public — degree of attention

The average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s degree of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.

In the present case, the goods found to be identical or similar to varying degrees are mainly directed at the public at large. Some of the goods, such as the contested protective helmets for cyclists and motorcyclists, target both the public at large and the professional public from the cycling and motorcycling fields. Given that the general public is more prone to confusion, the examination will proceed on this basis.

The degree of attention may vary from average to high, depending on the specialised nature of the goods, the frequency of purchase and their price.

3. The signs

BROOKS BROTHERS	BROOKS BIKE WEAR
Earlier trade mark	Contested sign

The relevant territory is the European Union.

The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).

The unitary character of the European Union trade mark means that an earlier European Union trade mark can be relied on in opposition proceedings against any application for registration of a European Union trade mark that would adversely affect the protection of the first mark, even if only in relation to the perception of consumers in part of the European Union (18/09/2008, C‑514/06 P, Armafoam, EU:C:2008:511, § 57). Therefore, a likelihood of confusion for only part of the relevant public of the European Union is sufficient to reject the contested application.

The signs are meaningful in those countries where English is understood, for example in Malta. This affects the perception of the signs by that public, in particular their conceptual understanding, and the assessment of likelihood of confusion in these territories, as explained below. Moreover, in its observations of 23/04/2019, the applicant argued that its marks ‘BROOKS’ and were used and coexisted with the opponent’s trade marks in various countries of the European Union. However, neither the applicant’s arguments nor the evidence submitted refer to the territory of Malta. Bearing in mind that a likelihood of confusion for only part of the relevant public of the European Union is sufficient to reject the contested application, the Opposition Division finds it appropriate to focus the comparison of the signs on the English-speaking part of the public in Malta.

Both signs are word marks. In the case of word marks, it is the word as such that is protected and not its written form. For the same reason, word marks have no elements that could be considered more dominant (eye-catching) than other elements.

The earlier mark is composed of the words ‘BROOKS BROTHERS’ and the contested sign is composed of the words ‘BROOKS BIKE WEAR’.

As argued by applicant, the coinciding word ‘BROOKS’ will be understood by the public as a common surname originating from the same family root (information extracted from House of Names on 13/11/2019 at www.houseofnames.com/brooks-family-crest and www.houseofnames.com/brook-family-crest; see also forebears.io/surnames, referred to by the applicant in its observations of 23/04/2019). A part of the public, particularly a part unfamiliar with the surname ‘BROOKS’, may perceive it as a plural form of the noun ‘brook’, meaning ‘a small stream’ (information extracted from Collins Dictionary on 13/11/2019 at www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/brook). Whatever the meaning, these concepts are not descriptive, allusive or otherwise weak in relation to the relevant goods and, therefore, their inherent distinctive character is average.

As argued by the parties, the English word ‘BROTHERS’ of the earlier mark will be understood as a reference to male persons having the same parents. In addition, as noted by the opponent, ‘BROTHERS’ is often used in the names of some companies and shops, for example ‘the film company Warner Brothers’ (information extracted from Collins Dictionary on 13/11/2019 at www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
english/brother). The relevant public will immediately understand that the expression ‘BROOKS BROTHERS’ refers to the establishment founded, owned or run by brothers whose family name is Brooks. As such, ‘BROTHERS’ is conceptually subordinate to the word ‘BROOKS’ that precedes it and, consequently, the word ‘BROOKS’ will be seen as the main trade identifier of the opponent’s goods.

The English words ‘BIKE’ and ‘WEAR’ will be understood as nouns referring to ‘a bicycle or a motorcycle’ and ‘clothes that are suitable for a certain time or place’ respectively (information extracted from Collins Dictionary on 13/11/2019 at www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/bike and www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/wear). The relevant public will immediately understand that the expression ‘BIKE WEAR’, as a whole, indicates clothes that are suitable for bicyclists or motorcyclists. Therefore, this expression is directly descriptive and non-distinctive for a part of the contested goods (e.g. jackets, shorts, trousers, jerseys, sweatshirts, dungarees, tops, bodysuits, all for cyclists and motorcyclists in Class 25) and it is distinctive to at most a low degree for the remaining goods (e.g. bags, handbags, rucksacks, small rucksacks, waist packs, all for cyclists and motorcyclists in Class 18).

According to settled case-law consumers generally tend to focus on the beginning of a sign when they encounter a trade mark. This is because the public reads from left to right, which makes the part placed at the left of the sign (the initial part) the one that first catches the attention of the reader.

Visually, the signs coincide in the word ‘BROOKS’, namely in their entire first element. The earlier mark differs in the word ‘BROTHERS’, located in a less conspicuous position as the second word and having a subordinate function to the word ‘BROOKS’. The contested sign differs from the earlier mark in the words ‘BIKE WEAR’, which, however, are either non-distinctive or distinctive to at most a low degree. Therefore, the signs are visually similar to an above-average degree.

Aurally, the pronunciation coincides identically in the word ‘BROOKS’, located at the beginning of the signs. It differs in their remaining elements, namely ‘BROTHERS’ and ‘BIKE WEAR’ respectively. Given that the expression ‘BIKE WEAR’ has an informative/allusive meaning, it is plausible that the relevant public will not pronounce it at all. Therefore, the signs are aurally highly similar.

Conceptually, reference is made to the previous assertions concerning the semantic content conveyed by the marks. As both signs will be associated with the same meaning(s) evoked by the word ‘BROOKS’, and despite the presence of additional elements in the signs that are either conceptually subordinate (‘BROTHERS’) or non-distinctive/distinctive to at most a low degree (‘BIKE WEAR’), the signs are conceptually similar to at least an average degree.

As the signs have been found similar in at least one aspect of the comparison, the examination of likelihood of confusion will proceed.

4. Distinctiveness of the earlier mark

The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.

The opponent initially invoked Article 8(5) EUTMR in relation to this earlier mark and claimed that it enjoyed a reputation (and therefore also enhanced distinctiveness). However, the opponent did not file any evidence to prove this claim and, moreover, the claim based on Article 8(5) EUTMR was later withdrawn.

Consequently, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark will rest on its distinctiveness per se. In the present case, the earlier trade mark as a whole has no meaning for any of the goods in question from the perspective of the public in the relevant territory. Therefore, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as normal.

5. Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion

The appreciation of likelihood of confusion on the part of the public depends on numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the earlier mark on the market, the association that can be made with the registered mark and the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods or services identified. It must be appreciated globally, taking into account all the factors relevant to the circumstances of the case (22/06/1999, C‑342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 18; 11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 22).

The goods are identical and similar to varying degrees, including to a low degree. The signs are visually similar to an above-average degree and aurally highly similar. As explained in section c) of this decision, the signs are conceptually similar to at least an average degree in relation to the perception of the relevant public.

The earlier mark as a whole has a normal degree of distinctiveness for the relevant public, composed of the general public displaying an average to high degree of attention. Account is taken of the fact that average consumers, even those who pay a high degree of attention, rarely have the chance to make a direct comparison between different marks, but must trust in their imperfect recollection of them (22/06/1999, C 342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 26; 21/11/2013, T‑443/12, ancotel, EU:T:2013:605, § 54).

Both marks are word marks. The first word of the earlier mark, ‘BROOKS’, is entirely and without modifications included at the beginning of the contested sign, where it constitutes its most distinctive element. The signs differ in their remaining elements, which are located in less conspicuous positions and are either conceptually subordinate to the word ‘BROOKS’ (‘BROTHERS’ in the earlier mark) or non-distinctive or distinctive to at most a low degree (‘BIKE WEAR’ in the contested sign). Consequently, consumers are likely to pay less attention to these differing elements than to the coinciding and normally distinctive word ‘BROOKS’.

Therefore, the differences between the signs are not sufficient to counteract the overall impression that the signs are similar.

Moreover, a global assessment of a likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors and, in particular, a similarity between the marks and between the goods or services. Accordingly, a greater degree of similarity between the goods and services may be offset by a lower degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (22/06/1999, C‑342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 19; 11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 24; 29/09/1998, C‑39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17). Therefore, the fact that some of the contested goods are similar to a low degree to the opponent’s goods is compensated by the overall similarities between the signs.

Although the public will not overlook the additional verbal elements of the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion also includes the likelihood of association, which is especially relevant in the present case. It covers situations where consumers directly confuse the trade marks themselves, or where consumers make a connection between the conflicting signs and assume that the services covered are from the same or economically linked undertakings. Even if the marks were not directly confused with one another, for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR, there is a likelihood of confusion when average consumers, although aware of the differences between the signs, nevertheless assume, owing to the use of the identical word ‘BROOKS’, that they are derived from the same or an economically linked undertaking.

Indeed, in the present case it is highly conceivable that the relevant consumer will perceive the mark applied for as a sub-brand of the earlier mark configured in a different way according to the type of goods that it designates (23/10/2002, T‑104/01, Fifties, EU:T:2002:262, § 49), for example a new version of the opponent’s mark designed specifically for the goods for cyclists and motorcyclists.

For the sake of completeness, the Opposition Division notes that the applicant argued that it owned several earlier trade marks with the word ‘BROOKS’, some of which predated the opponent’s trade marks registered in the EU. The applicant additionally argued that its trade marks, as well as the contested one, enjoyed enhanced distinctiveness and even a reputation for cycling goods and, consequently, there could be no likelihood of confusion in the present case. The applicant submitted various items of evidence to substantiate this claim. In this respect it is noted that the right to an EUTM begins on the date when the EUTM is filed and not before, and from that date on the EUTM has to be examined with regard to opposition proceedings. When considering whether or not the EUTM falls under any of the relative grounds for refusal, events or facts that happened before the filing date of the EUTM are irrelevant because the rights of the opponent, insofar as they predate the EUTM, are earlier than the applicant’s EUTM. Therefore, this argument of the applicant must be rejected.

The applicant argued that it had been using its earlier marks for many years widely and extensively in the cycling sector and that its marks coexisted with the opponent’s earlier marks in the marketplace.

According to case-law, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the coexistence of two marks on a particular market might, together with other elements, contribute to diminishing the likelihood of confusion between those marks on the part of the relevant public (03/09/2009, C‑498/07 P, La Española, EU:C:2013:302, § 82). In certain cases, the coexistence of earlier marks in the market could reduce the likelihood of confusion that the Office finds between two conflicting marks (11/05/2005, T‑31/03, Grupo Sada, EU:T:2005:169, § 86). However, that possibility can be taken into consideration only if, at the very least, during the proceedings before the EUIPO concerning relative grounds for refusal, the applicant for the European Union trade mark duly demonstrated that such coexistence was based upon the absence of any likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public between the earlier marks upon which it relies and the intervener’s earlier mark on which the opposition is based, and provided that the earlier marks concerned and the marks at issue are identical (11/05/2005, T‑31/03, Grupo Sada, EU:T:2005:169, § 86).

In this regard it should be noted that formal coexistence in national or Union registries of certain marks is not per se particularly relevant. It should also be proved that they coexist in the market, which could actually indicate that consumers are used to seeing the marks without confusing them. Last but not least, it is important to note that the Office is in principle restricted in its examination to the trade marks in conflict.

Only under special circumstances may the Opposition Division consider evidence of the coexistence of other marks in the market (and possibly in the register) at national/Union level as an indication of ‘dilution’ of the distinctive character of the opponent’s mark that might be contrary to an assumption of likelihood of confusion. This has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and such an indicative value should be treated with caution as there may be different reasons as to why similar signs coexist, e.g. different legal or factual situations in the past, or prior rights agreements between the parties involved.

Firstly, the coexistence must concern the relevant countries in the case and, if the earlier trade mark is an EUTM, the EUTM applicant must show coexistence in the entire EU. Neither the applicant’s arguments nor the evidence submitted refer to the territory of Malta, to which this examination is limited.

Moreover, most of the materials submitted postdate the application date of the contested sign (i.e. 26/03/2007) by many years, for example copies of The Brooks Bugle or The Bugle editions of 2011-2014 (Annex 8), market surveys conducted in Germany and the UK in 2015 (Annex 9), extracts from the applicant’s website showing official retailers as of 2019 (Annex 11), promotional and advertising materials from 2013-2015 (Annexes 12-14), information about the applicant’s products from various magazines dated 2009, 2012 and 2014 (Annex 15), extracts from the Brooks England website from 2019 (Annex 16), extracts from the Brooks England Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram accounts from 2019, most of which were created in 2010 (Annex 17), printout from the Brooks England website events page from 2016-2018 (Annex 18), selection of awards from 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 (Annex 20). Consequently, these items of evidence are not particularly useful in establishing coexistence with the earlier marks.

Furthermore, the evidence refers to trade marks that are different from the mark applied for, ‘BROOKS BIKE WEAR’. They mostly refer to the figurative mark and its variations , but also to completely different designations with the name ‘BROOKS’, for example:

.

As outlined above, the earlier (‘coexisting’) marks and the marks at issue should be identical to those involved in the opposition before the Office (11/05/2005, T‑31/03, Grupo Sada, EU:T:2005:169, § 86; 18/09/2012, T‑460/11, Bürger, EU:T:2012:432, § 60-61) and cover the same goods or services as those in conflict (30/03/2010, R 1021/2009‑1, ECLIPSE / ECLIPSE (FiG. MARK), § 14). This condition is not fulfilled in the present case.

In addition, as correctly noted in the opponent’s observations dated 11/07/2019, the evidence submitted relates mainly to cycle saddles and accessories, which are not even covered by the contested application, and bags, but it does not address the remaining goods of the contested sign.

Therefore, in the absence of convincing arguments and evidence thereof, this argument of the applicant must be rejected as unfounded.

The applicant also argued that consumers in the EU were aware of the presence of many trade marks incorporating the element ‘BROOKS’ and originating from different undertakings. In support of this argument, the applicant referred to several trade mark registrations in various countries of the EU. However, the Opposition Division notes that the existence of several trade mark registrations is not per se particularly conclusive, as it does not necessarily reflect the situation in the market. In other words, on the basis of register data only, it cannot be assumed that all such trade marks have been effectively used. It follows that the evidence filed does not demonstrate that consumers have been exposed to widespread use of, and have become accustomed to, trade marks that include the word ‘BROOKS’. Under these circumstances, this claim of the applicant must also be set aside.

Taking into account the above factors, the Opposition Division considers that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the English-speaking part of the public in Malta. As stated above in section c) of this decision, a likelihood of confusion for only part of the relevant public of the European Union is sufficient to reject the contested application; therefore, there is no need to analyse the remaining part of the public, including the perception of the professional public.

Consequently, the opposition is well founded on the basis of the opponent’s international trade mark registration No 893 183 designating the European Union. It follows that the contested trade mark must be rejected for all the contested goods.

As the earlier right international trade mark registration No 893 183 designating the European Union leads to the success of the opposition and to the rejection of the contested trade mark for all the goods against which the opposition was directed, there is no need to examine the other earlier rights invoked by the opponent (16/09/2004, T‑342/02, Moser Grupo Media, S.L., EU:T:2004:268).

COSTS

According to Article 109(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party.

Since the applicant is the losing party, it must bear the opposition fee as well as the costs incurred by the opponent in the course of these proceedings.

According to Article 109(1) and (7) EUTMR and Article 18(1)(c)(i) EUTMIR (former Rule 94(3) and (6) and Rule 94(7)(d)(i) EUTMIR, in force before 01/10/2017), the costs to be paid to the opponent are the opposition fee and the costs of representation, which are to be fixed on the basis of the maximum rate set therein.

The Opposition Division

Liliya YORDANOVA

Jakub MROZOWSKI

Reiner SARAPOGLU

According to Article 67 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 68 EUTMR, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds for appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be deemed to have been filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.