OPPOSITION No B 3 051 796

Hikari Indústria e Comércio Ltda., Rua Antonio Ruvolo, 653 Ferraz de Vasconcelos-SP, Brazil (opponent), represented by Abril Abogados, C/Amador de los Ríos, 1-1°, 28010 Madrid, Spain (professional representative)

a g a i n s t

Hikari Miso Co. Ltd., 4848-1 Shimosuwa-machi, Suwa-gun, Nagano-ken, Japan (applicant), represented by Frohwitter Patent- Und Rechtsanwälte, Possartstr. 20, 81679 Munich, Germany (professional representative).

On 02/06/2020, the Opposition Division takes the following

DECISION:

1. Opposition No B 3 084 338 is upheld for all the contested goods.

2. European Union trade mark application No 18 025 739 is rejected in its entirety.

3. The applicant bears the costs, fixed at EUR 620.

REASONS

The opponent filed an opposition against all the goods of European Union trade mark application No 18 025 739 for the word mark ‘HIKARI HACCHO’. The opposition is based on the European Union trade mark registration No 8 114 902 for the figurative mark . The opponent invoked Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR.

PROOF OF USE

In accordance with Article 47(2) and (3) EUTMR, if the applicant so requests, the opponent must furnish proof that, during the five-year period preceding the date of filing or, where applicable, the date of priority of the contested trade mark, the earlier trade mark has been put to genuine use in the territories in which it is protected in connection with the goods or services for which it is registered and which the opponent cites as justification for its opposition, or that there are proper reasons for non-use. The earlier mark is subject to the use obligation if, at that date, it has been registered for at least five years.

The same provision states that, in the absence of such proof, the opposition will be rejected.

The applicant requested that the opponent submit proof of use of the trade marks on which the opposition is based.

The date of filing of the contested application is 09/04/2018. The opponent was therefore required to prove that the trade mark on which the opposition is based was put to genuine use in the European Union from 09/04/2013 to 08/04/2018 inclusive.

As informed during the proceedings, the applicant missed the deadline of 15/02/2019 for submitting the request for proof of use by way of a separate document as required by Article 10(1) EUTMDR. The applicant was informed of this in the letter of 04/03/2019. On 15/04/2019 (within two months of the expiry of the unobserved time limit, as Article 105 EUTMR requires), the applicant requested the Office for a continuation of proceedings in relation to the deadline for the request for proof of use. On 26/04/2019, the Office informed the parties that pursuant to Article 105 EUTMR, such a request was admissible and granted and, therefore, the Office requested the opponent to submit proof of use of the trade marks on which the opposition is based.

Furthermore, the evidence must show use of the trade mark for the goods and services on which the opposition is based, namely the following:

Class 30: Tapioca, cheese bread, powdered chocolate, manioc sago, flavourings for food, honey, sugar, bicarbonate of soda, teas, cinnamon sticks, cinnamon powder, cumin powder, African marigold, white brush, barbecue condiments, pepper, ketchup, mustard, sauces (condiments); expressly excluding sweet rice flour, rice punch, rice, rice rolls, confectionery; bread and buns; miso (soya bean paste, condiment).

Class 35: Import and export of tapioca, cheese bread, powdered chocolate, manioc sago, flavourings for food, honey, sugar, bicarbonate of soda, teas, cinnamon sticks, cinnamon powder, cumin powder, African marigold, white brush, barbecue condiments, pepper, ketchup, mustard, sauces (condiments); expressly excluding sweet rice flour, rice punch, rice, rice rolls, confectionery; bread and buns; miso (soya bean paste, condiment).

According to Article 10(3) EUTMDR, the evidence of use must consist of indications concerning the place, time, extent and nature of use of the opposing trade mark for the goods or services in respect of which it is registered and on which the opposition is based.

On 26/04/2019, in accordance with Article 10(2) EUTMDR, the Office gave the opponent until 01/07/2019 to submit evidence of use of the earlier trade mark. On 27/06/2019, within the time limit, the opponent submitted evidence of use.

The evidence to be taken into account is the following:

• Documents 1-6: more than 30 invoices issued by the opponent (Hikari Indústria e Comércio Ltda, with domicile in Brazil) and addressed to customers located in Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain, and dated from 2013 to 2018 (a few of them are dated slightly before and after the relevant period). They refer to different types of foodstuffs (e.g. ‘seasoned with pepper’, ‘seasoned corn meal’, ‘wheat for kibe’, ‘sour cassava starch’, ‘salt’; in Portuguese ‘tempero carnes’, tempero legumes’, ‘tempero completo’, which are types of seasonings/concentrates, ‘molho de pimenta’ (pepper sauce); and in Italian ‘farina di manioca’ (manioc flour) and ‘olio di dende’ (dende oil)), and the sign appears in the top left corner. The information is mainly in English and Portuguese, but on some of the invoices, targeting clients from Italy, the description of the goods is in Italian. However, the main elements of the invoices are in English and are self-explanatory. The invoices reflect significant sales and total amounts (e.g. the invoices dated 20/01/2014 for USD 25,152.30 and 20/06/2014 for USD 42,542.90). They include additional information such as the code of the products, type of article (sacks, cases), weights, terms of payment, insurances and type of shipment.

Additionally, together with the invoices, there are a number of documents related to the import, shipment and payment of the invoiced products (e.g. certificates of origin, bill of lading and ‘contrato de câmbio’ (exchange contract)) issued by different entities and companies (‘FACESP’, ‘DC LOGISTICS’, ‘OVERSEAS’ and ‘Trans Service Line’).

Finally, included is the product description for some the invoiced products under the brand ‘HIKARI’. Although the information is in Portuguese, it can easily be inferred that it reflects the specific product specifications (percentage of lipids, carbohydrates, etc.).

• Document 7: undated pictures and printouts from the opponent’s website, showing a range of products branded with the earlier mark. See examples below of some of the invoiced products (i.e. vegetable and meat seasonings/extracts, flour and dende oil).

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On 31/03/2020, after expiry of the time limit, the opponent submitted additional evidence as a response to the applicant’s arguments regarding the proof of use. In particular, the opponent submitted printouts of the websites of the opponent’s distributors in Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Portugal, showing some ‘Hikari’ products for sale (Documents 1-3); declarations signed by the opponent’s distributors in Portugal, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium and France, stating that they have been selling ‘Hikari’ products since 2006 and 2008 (Document 4).

In the present case, the issue of whether or not the Office may exercise the discretion conferred on it by Article 95(2) EUTMR to take into account the additional evidence may remain open as it has no material effect on the outcome of the present proceedings, as will be demonstrated below. In any event, the additional evidence merely strengthens and clarifies the evidence submitted initially, as it does not introduce new elements of evidence but merely enhances the conclusiveness of the evidence submitted within the time limit.

Moreover, by accepting and taking the additional evidence into account, the proceedings should be reopened to allow an extra round of observations from the applicant who must have the opportunity to comment on this evidence as required by Article 94(1) EUTMR. This would unnecessarily delay the course of the present proceeding. Consequently, for reasons of procedural economy, the Opposition Division will not give the applicant another round to comment on the additional evidence submitted by the opponents, since these documents will not be taken into account in the present assessment.

Assessment of genuine use — factors

The applicant argued that most of the invoices are not in English, which ‘makes impossible to assign the goods listed’. However, the opponent is not under any obligation to translate the proof of use, unless it is specifically requested to do so by the Office (Article 10(6) EUTMDR). The structure of the invoices is in English and the language of the products varies according to the targeted countries. It is deemed that there are sufficient invoices with the description in English (those related to the United Kingdom and Spain) to ascertain the nature of the goods. Moreover, those in Portuguese and Italian may easily be matched with the photos/description of the products and/or by the closeness of the words (e.g. ‘Olio de denge’ and ‘denge oil’). Taking this into account, the Opposition Division considers that there is no need to request a translation.

Place of use

The invoices submitted show the import of a significant amount of foodstuffs into the European Union (i.e. the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy and Spain) from Brazil, as suggested by the addresses of the companies receiving the goods. However, the ‘distributors’ do not appear to be economically dependent on or connected to the opponent and are, rather, customers (clients) of the opponent who apparently also offer the purchased goods for sale (resale).

The import of the goods into the relevant area may, depending on the circumstances of the case, suffice as proof of use in this area. As the Court has held, upon analysis of documents referring to the import of goods, the mark in question must be used in the context ‘of a commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter’ (09/07/2010, T‑430/08, Grain Millers, EU:T:2010:304, § 40).

The invoices are for the sale of goods over a continuous period of time and it is clear that the opponent sells these goods for commercial purpose, namely to gain profit. This can be inferred from the amounts invoiced (being significant) and the opponent’s wire transfer instructions and bank details given on the invoices. The further commercial realisation of the goods and potential retailing of these goods to other customers does not alter the fact that the opponent is selling goods to these companies and is importing them into the relevant territory.

Therefore, it is considered that the evidence relates to the relevant territory.

Time of use

Most of the evidence is dated within the relevant period.

Evidence referring to use made outside the relevant timeframe is disregarded unless it contains conclusive indirect proof that the mark must have been put to genuine use during the relevant period of time as well. It has to be considered in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, which is dated, because, in the context of an overall assessment, it may be relevant. A few invoices are dated outside the relevant period (slightly before and after), however, they merely reinforce the fact that the opponent has made a continuous and long-lasting use of the mark since the majority of the submitted invoices belong to the relevant period. As regards the documentation expressing the product descriptions and the printout of the opponent’s website showing the packages, it helps to better ascertain the nature and appearance of the invoiced products (although the description by itself is quite apparent).

Therefore, the evidence of use filed by the opponent contains sufficient indications concerning the time of use.

Extent of use

As regards the extent of use, all the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account, including the nature of the relevant goods or services and the characteristics of the market concerned, the territorial extent of use, and its commercial volume, duration and frequency.

The assessment of genuine use entails a degree of interdependence between the factors taken into account. Thus, the fact that commercial volume achieved under the mark was not high may be offset by the fact that use of the mark was extensive or very regular, and vice versa. Likewise, the territorial scope of the use is only one of several factors to be taken into account, so that a limited territorial scope of use can be counteracted by a more significant volume or duration of use.

The invoices submitted provide the Office with sufficient information concerning the commercial volume, the territorial scope, the duration and the frequency of use, as they indicate solid and continuous sales/imports throughout a period of around five years in the relevant timeframe, identifying the services and goods provided with the earlier mark. The applicant solely disputes this factor, considering that the extent of use of the mark is insufficient. Although the quantities sold are not particularly high, and the opponent could have submitted additional means of evidence (e.g. sales volume generated) to evaluate the extent of use more precisely, it is deemed that the invoices have been submitted merely by way of illustration of the total sales and that the items of evidence in conjunction with each other demonstrate a sufficient extent of use of the earlier mark, at least in relation to some of the goods, as will be detailed below.

It is noted that the mark must be used publicly and outwardly in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage for the purpose of ensuring an outlet for the goods and services that it represents (12/03/2003, T‑174/01, Silk Cocoon, EU:T:2003:68, § 39; 30/04/2008, T‑131/06, Sonia Sonia Rykiel, EU:T:2008:135, § 38). However, outward use does not necessarily imply use aimed at end consumers. For instance, the relevant evidence can validly stem from an intermediary, whose activity consists of identifying professional purchasers, such as distribution companies, to whom the intermediary sells products it has had manufactured by original producers (21/11/2013, T‑524/12, RECARO, EU:T:2013:604, § 25-26). The products invoiced to the ‘distributors’ of the goods demonstrate that the opponent has built a network of companies for marketing its goods in the relevant territory and for the retail/wholesale of these goods under the given brand.

Nature of use

In the context of Article 10(3) EUTMDR, the expression ‘nature of use’ includes evidence of use of the sign in accordance with its function, of use of the mark as registered, or of a variation thereof according to Article 18(1), second subparagraph, point (a) EUTMR, and of its use for the goods and services for which it is registered.

According to Article 18(1), second subparagraph, point (a), EUTMR, the following will also constitute use within the meaning of paragraph 1: use of the European Union trade mark in a form differing in elements that do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered, regardless of whether or not the trade mark in the form as used is also registered in the name of the proprietor. When examining the use of an earlier registration for the purposes of Article 47(2) and (3) EUTMR, Article 18 may be applied by analogy to assess whether or not the use of the sign constitutes genuine use of the earlier mark as far as its nature is concerned.

The evidence demonstrates that the earlier trade mark has been used as registered. It is shown on the invoices, in product descriptions and in their packages, as the brand identifying the products and the company.

In view of the above, the Opposition Division considers that the evidence does show use of the sign as a trade mark and as registered within the meaning of Article 18(1), second subparagraph, point (a), EUTMR.

Conclusion

The Court of Justice has held that there is ‘genuine use’ of a mark where it is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services. Genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark. Furthermore, the condition of genuine use of the mark requires that the mark, as protected in the relevant territory, be used publicly and outwardly (11/03/2003, C‑40/01, Minimax, EU:C:2003:145; 12/03/2003, T‑174/01, Silk Cocoon, EU:T:2003:68).

Taking into account the evidence in its entirety, although the evidence submitted by the opponent is not particularly exhaustive, it does reach the minimum level necessary to establish genuine use of the earlier trade mark during the relevant period in the relevant territory.

However, the evidence filed by the opponent does not demonstrate genuine use of the trade mark for all the goods and services covered by the earlier trade mark.

According to Article 47(2) EUTMR, if the earlier trade mark has been used in relation to only some of the goods or services for which it is registered it will, for the purposes of the examination of the opposition, be deemed to be registered in respect only of those goods or services.

According to case-law, when applying the abovementioned provision, the following should be considered:

… if a trade mark has been registered for a category of goods or services which is sufficiently broad for it to be possible to identify within it a number of sub-categories capable of being viewed independently, proof that the mark has been put to genuine use in relation to a part of those goods or services affords protection, in opposition proceedings, only for the sub-category or sub-categories to which the goods or services for which the trade mark has actually been used belong. However, if a trade mark has been registered for goods or services defined so precisely and narrowly that it is not possible to make any significant sub-divisions within the category concerned, then the proof of genuine use of the mark for the goods or services necessarily covers the entire category for the purposes of the opposition.

Although the principle of partial use operates to ensure that trade marks which have not been used for a given category of goods are not rendered unavailable, it must not, however, result in the proprietor of the earlier trade mark being stripped of all protection for goods which, although not strictly identical to those in respect of which he has succeeded in proving genuine use, are not in essence different from them and belong to a single group which cannot be divided other than in an arbitrary manner. The Court observes in that regard that in practice it is impossible for the proprietor of a trade mark to prove that the mark has been used for all conceivable variations of the goods concerned by the registration. Consequently, the concept of ‘part of the goods or services’ cannot be taken to mean all the commercial variations of similar goods or services but merely goods or services which are sufficiently distinct to constitute coherent categories or sub-categories.

(14/07/2005, T‑126/03, Aladin, EU:T:2005:288, § 45-46.)

In the present case, the goods appearing on the invoices and the rest of the supporting documents, refer to a large variety of foodstuffs and ingredients. Some of these goods, such as seasoned pepper, salt, flavouring concentrates and pepper sauce, belong to the category flavourings for food. As the opponent is not required to prove all the conceivable variations of the category of goods for which the earlier mark is registered and as the goods for which use has been proved do not constitute a coherent subcategory within the broad category in the specification to which they belong, the Opposition Division considers that the evidence shows genuine use of the trade mark for flavourings for food in Class 30.

There are also indications regarding foodstuff of a different nature, such as corns, flour or cheese bread, as well as for import services of the kind of goods for which use is shown. However, since likelihood of confusion can be established on the basis of a finding of genuine use for some of the earlier goods, the Opposition Division will only consider the abovementioned goods flavourings for food in Class 30 in its further examination of the opposition, as these are the most relevant goods for the examination of the opposition vis-à-vis the contested trade mark (see below).

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION — ARTICLE 8(1)(b) EUTMR

A likelihood of confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. Whether a likelihood of confusion exists depends on the appreciation in a global assessment of several factors, which are interdependent. These factors include the similarity of the signs, the similarity of the goods and services, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the distinctive and dominant elements of the conflicting signs, and the relevant public.

1. The goods

Following the assessment of proof of use, the goods on which the opposition is based are the following:

Class 30: Flavourings for food.

The contested goods are the following:

Class 29: Pre-cooked curry stew; pre-cooked soup; pre-cooked miso soup; soup mixes; instant soup; instant miso soup.

Class 30: Stew seasoning mixes; bean-starch noodles (harusame, uncooked); miso [condiment].

The relevant factors relating to the comparison of the goods or services include, inter alia, the nature and purpose of the goods or services, the distribution channels, the sales outlets, the producers, the method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or complementary to each other.

Contested goods in Classes 29 and 30

The contested goods in Class 29 are kinds of instant meals/soups, normally made out of different ingredients, such as dry and cooked vegetables, spices, meat extracts, designed for fast and simple preparation (e.g. by heating and adding water). The contested goods in Class 30 include uncooked harusame, which is a dish of Japanese origin, generally sold in dried form and prepared in a similar way to the instant soups or broths (adding water), and stew seasonings and miso condiment. All these goods have relevant commonalities with the opponent’s flavourings for food in Class 30, which is a category that includes liquid or solid extracts, cooking essences, and flavours that are added to foods to enhance their taste and aroma (e.g. spices, herbs, concentrate extracts, sauces and exotic flavours). The goods may have the same usual producer, target the same relevant public and share the distribution channels, contrary to the applicant’s claim. In fact, they are usually available close to each other in the same sections/shelves of supermarkets or distributed via specialised (online) stores. Moreover, some of them may be in competition (e.g. vegetable concentrates v instant soup) in the sense that one (the former) can be used to substitute the other (the latter). Therefore, the contested goods are at least similar to a low degree.

2. Relevant public — degree of attention

The average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s degree of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.

The goods found to be at least similar to a low degree target the public at large. The degree of attention is average.

3. The signs

	HIKARI HACCHO
Earlier trade mark	Contested sign

The relevant territory is the European Union.

The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).

The verbal element ‘Hikari’, included in both signs, will be perceived as a meaningless fanciful word by the majority of the public and, therefore, it holds an average degree of distinctiveness (11/12/2015, T‑751/14, Hikari / HIKARI, EU:T:2015:956, § 56, in relation to the relevant public in the United Kingdom). If the term were associated with a Japanese given name by a part of the relevant public, as the applicant contends, this element must still be considered fully distinctive, because it has no meaning for the relevant goods nor is it deemed that it is ‘frequently used as a trade mark’, the extent of which has not been proven; consequently, that concept, present in both signs, would go, a fortiori, against the interest of the applicant.

The earlier mark’s figurative elements are not considered very imaginative, and are rather commonplace for this kind of products, contrary to the applicant’s opinion. They have an essentially ornamental function and do not detract from the public’s ability to immediately perceive the verbal element, to which consumers will normally attribute more importance (14/07/2005, T‑312/03, Selenium-Ace, EU:T:2005:289, § 37). Its degree of distinctiveness is at most low. Moreover, the contested sign is a word mark. The protection that results from the registration of a word mark concerns the word mentioned in the application for registration and not the specific graphic or stylistic elements accompanying that mark (07/10/2010, T‑244/09, Acsensa, EU:T:2010:430, § 28). The case letter and stylisation used by the contested sign could therefore be identical to that used by the earlier mark (29/03/2012, T‑369/10, Beatle, EU:T:2012:177, § 42).

The additional verbal element ‘HACCHO’ of the contested sign will also be perceived as a meaningless word by the relevant public and, therefore, it has an average degree of distinctiveness.

The signs have no element that could be considered more dominant (eye-catching) than other elements. However, the fact that the coinciding element is entirely included in the first part of the contested sign (and the differing word is at its end) is particularly relevant in the present case since consumers generally tend to focus on the beginning of a sign when they encounter a trade mark. This is because the public reads from left to right, which makes the part placed at the left of the sign (the initial part, i.e. ‘HIKARI’) the one that first catches the attention of the reader.

Visually and aurally, the signs coincide in the letters and sound of the distinctive word ‘Hikari’, which constitutes the sole verbal element of the earlier mark and the first word of the contested sign. They differ only in the word and pronunciation of the second verbal element ‘HACCHO’ of the contested sign, which is also fully distinctive and has no counterpart in the earlier mark. However, as mentioned above, the fact that this element is placed at the end of the contested sign leads to a lesser impact within the overall impression.

Visually, the signs differ in the figurative elements of the earlier mark, which are, however, rather decorative and have little trade mark significance.

Therefore, the signs are visually and aurally similar to at least an average degree.

Conceptually, neither of the signs has a meaning for the public in the relevant territory. Since a conceptual comparison is not possible, the conceptual aspect does not influence the assessment of the similarity of the signs.

As the signs have been found similar in at least one aspect of the comparison, the examination of likelihood of confusion will proceed.

4. Distinctiveness of the earlier mark

The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.

The opponent did not explicitly claim that its mark is particularly distinctive by virtue of intensive use or reputation.

Consequently, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark will rest on its distinctiveness per se. In the present case, the verbal element ‘Hikari’ has no meaning for any of the goods in question from the perspective of the public in the relevant territory. Therefore, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as normal.

5. Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion

The contested goods are similar to at least a low degree. They target the public at large, whose degree of attention is average. The earlier mark has a normal degree of distinctiveness.

The signs are visually and aurally similar to at least an average degree and the conceptual aspect remains neutral, as they will be perceived as fanciful. The contested sign entirely reproduces the verbal element ‘Hikari’ of the earlier mark (which has an average degree of distinctiveness) as its first element, to which consumers attach more importance. Therefore, the presence of the additional word ‘HACCHO’ of the contested sign, despite being fully distinctive, and the figurative elements of the earlier mark, which have little trade mark significance, are clearly not sufficient to counterbalance the commonalities between the signs and exclude a likelihood of confusion.

Additionally, given the partial identity between the signs, it is likely that consumers will perceive the differing elements as different versions of the marks (e.g. according to a given product line). It is common practice in the relevant market for manufacturers to make variations in their trade marks, for example by altering the typeface or colours or by adding verbal or figurative elements, to denote a new product. Therefore, the likelihood that the public may associate the signs with each other is very real. For instance, the additional word ‘HACCHO’ may be perceived as a new product or recipe within the range of products of the brand ‘Hikari’.

Moreover, evaluating likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors and, in particular, a similarity between the marks and between the goods or services. Therefore, a lesser degree of similarity between goods and services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks and vice versa (29/09/1998, C‑39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17). The similarity between the signs is sufficient to outweigh the – at least – low degree of similarity between the goods.

Considering all the above, there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.

Therefore, the opposition is well founded on the basis of the opponent’s European Union trade mark registration No 8 114 902. It follows that the contested trade mark must be rejected for all the contested goods.

COSTS

According to Article 109(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party.

Since the applicant is the losing party, it must bear the opposition fee as well as the costs incurred by the opponent in the course of these proceedings.

According to Article 109(1) and (7) EUTMR and Article 18(1)(c)(i) EUTMIR, the costs to be paid to the opponent are the opposition fee and the costs of representation, which are to be fixed on the basis of the maximum rate set therein.

The Opposition Division

Michele M. BENEDETTI-ALOISI

Birgit FILTENBORG

Riccardo RAPONI

According to Article 67 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 68 EUTMR, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds for appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be deemed to have been filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.