OPPOSITION No B 3 059 575

Les Editions P. Amaury, 738 rue Yves Kermen, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, France (opponent), represented by NautaDutilh, Chaussée de la Hulpe 120, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium and Marianna Laborde, avenue Marceau 2, 75008 Paris, France (professional representatives)

a g a i n s t

MIFOX GmbH, Uferstieg 3, 24955 Harrislee, Germany (applicant).

On 23/09/2019, the Opposition Division takes the following

DECISION:

1. Opposition No B 3 059 575 is upheld for all the contested services.

2. European Union trade mark application No 17 885 800 is rejected in its entirety.

3. The applicant bears the costs, fixed at EUR 620.

REASONS

The opponent filed an opposition against all the services of European Union trade mark application No 17 885 800 for the figurative mark . The opposition is based on, inter alia, French trade mark registration No 1 457 058 for the word mark ‘BALLON D’OR’. The opponent invoked Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) EUTMR.

REPUTATION — ARTICLE 8(5) EUTMR

For reasons of procedural economy, the Opposition Division will first examine the opposition in relation to the earlier French trade mark, for which the opponent claimed repute in France.

According to Article 8(5) EUTMR, upon opposition by the proprietor of a registered earlier trade mark within the meaning of Article 8(2) EUTMR, the contested trade mark will not be registered where it is identical with, or similar to, an earlier trade mark, irrespective of whether the goods or services for which it is applied are identical with, similar to or not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where, in the case of an earlier European Union trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Union or, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use without due cause of the contested trade mark would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.

Therefore, the grounds for refusal of Article 8(5) EUTMR are only applicable when the following conditions are met.

 The signs must be either identical or similar.

 The opponent’s trade mark must have a reputation. The reputation must also be prior to the filing of the contested sign; it must exist in the territory concerned and for the goods and/or services on which the opposition is based.

 Risk of injury: use of the contested trade mark would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark.

The abovementioned requirements are cumulative and, therefore, the absence of any one of them will lead to the rejection of the opposition under Article 8(5) EUTMR (16/12/2010, T‑345/08 & T‑357/08, Botolist / Botocyl, EU:T:2010:529, § 41). However, the fulfilment of all the abovementioned conditions may not be sufficient. The opposition may still fail if the applicant establishes due cause for the use of the contested trade mark.

In the present case, the applicant did not file any arguments and neither did it claim to have due cause for using the contested sign. Therefore, in the absence of any indications to the contrary, it must be assumed that no due cause exists.

a) Reputation of the earlier trade mark

According to the opponent, the earlier trade mark has a reputation in France.

Reputation implies a knowledge threshold that is reached only when the earlier mark is known by a significant part of the relevant public for the goods or services it covers. The relevant public is, depending on the goods or services marketed, either the public at large or a more specialised public.

In the present case, the contested sign was filed on 11/04/2018. Therefore, the opponent was required to prove that the trade mark on which the opposition is based had acquired a reputation in France prior to that date. The evidence must also show that the reputation was acquired for the services for which the opponent has claimed reputation, namely:

Class 41: Entertainment; organisation of competitions in the field of sport, education or entertainment.

The opposition is directed against the following services:

Class 41: Organisation of automobile rallies, tours and racing events Organisation of automobile rallies, tours and racing events.

In order to determine the mark’s level of reputation, all the relevant facts of the case must be taken into consideration, including, in particular, the market share held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in promoting it.

As the opponent requested to keep certain commercial data contained in the evidence confidential vis-à-vis third parties, the Opposition Division will describe the evidence only in the most general terms without divulging any such data.

On 26/02/2019, the opponent submitted, in particular, the following evidence:

 Decision of the General Court of 17/10/2018 in case T-8/17, EU:T:2018:692 (Golden Balls Ltd. / EUIPO), as well as previous Office decisions (issued in French language) in which the word mark ‘GOLDEN BALLS’ (of another third party) was opposed, in which it was every time established that the earlier mark enjoys a high degree of reputation in France for ‘sports competitions, organisation of sports competitions and arranging of award ceremonies’ and that at the relevant date, the ‘BALLON D’OR’ competition, an annual trophy awarded to the best professional footballer of the season is universally known amongst sporting personalities as well as the general public, in particular in France, on account of its media coverage (Exhibits 2.1-2.3).

 Two affidavits dated 29/01/2018 and 15/10/2018, respectively, signed by the Administrative and Financial Director of the creator of the Ballon d’Or events, stating the very high total amounts of investment of the events for the years 2014 – 2017 and by the managing Director of the opponent’s company group, Groupe AMAURY, stating the very significant average revenues per year (excluding taxes) recorded by the Groupe AMAURY subsidiaries for the commercialisation of the audio-visual rights to the BALLON D’OR award ceremony in the years 2012 – 2015 (as well as a certification, together with its English translation, by external audit company KPMG confirming these amounts) (Exhibits 3.1-3.1 bis).

 Television audience reports of the FIFA Ballon d’Or award ceremony by Kantar Sport. According to information contained in the report, Kantar Sport is a specialist sports and entertainment research company belonging to the Kantar Media Group. The reports concern the years 2011-2015. They show data concerning broadcast audiences worldwide and, as regards Europe, per country, with very significant peak average and total audience numbers in (inter alia) France (Exhibits 3.2.1-3.2.5, 3.3-3.4).

 Extensive press and media coverage throughout the EU Member States, including particularly France, in the period 2012-2016 (Exhibits 3.6); contracts and co-publishing contracts in French for the publication of books ’60 ans de BALLON D’OR’ and ‘Livre d’or de l’ EURO 2016’ and data on respective royalties received ( (Exhibits 5).

 Copy of judgment of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris of September 29, 2004, in French language, acknowledging that the ‘BALLON D’OR’ trademark acquired reputation with respect to a sport contest; copies of French newspaper ‘FRANCE FOOTBALL’, for the years 1956 (year of creation of the “BALLON D’OR” price), 2000 and 2001: articles relating to laureates, namely renowned football players such as Michael Owen and Luis Figo; Certificates, tables and press reviews (self-promotion operations and media impact); costs of trophies; clips from French television channels, photographs and opinion poll in, inter alia, France, showing the extensive and prominent use of BALLON D’OR in France in relation to the annual trophy ceremony awarded to the best professional footballers, dated in the period 1999 – 2017 (Exhibits 6, A-M).

On the basis of the above the Opposition Division concludes that the earlier trade mark has a high reputation in France. Indeed, in light of the evidence put forward that shows an overwhelming trade mark awareness, it is clear that the earlier trade mark has been subject to long-standing and intensive use and is generally known by the relevant public in the market at issue, where it enjoys a consolidated position, as has been attested by diverse independent sources. The marketing expenditure and revenues shown by the evidence and the various references in the press to its success all unequivocally show that the mark enjoys a very high degree of recognition among the relevant public, including the average public. While it is acknowledged that the cited General Court decision refers to a date significantly preceding the current relevant date in the present proceedings, reputation, especially an overwhelming one, is built up over a period of years and cannot simply be switched on and off; in addition, the submitted evidence in the present proceedings sufficiently covers the period that elapsed between the filed evidence related to those proceedings and the filing of the contested EUTM application.

While it is true that the cited previous national and Office decisions only have a relative probative value and are not binding, they are admissible evidence and may have evidentiary value, especially if they originate from a Member State the territory of which is also relevant for the opposition at hand, or relate to identical or similar marks. They should be evaluated in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, that, in the present case, corroborates it and supports the claim of a high reputation of the earlier mark.

Also, despite the fact that the cited national and Office decisions were issued in French and not accompanied by a translation in the language of proceedings, pursuant to Article 24 EUTMIR it is left to the discretion of the Office whether the opponent has to submit a translation of the evidence of reputation into the language of the proceedings. If the applicant explicitly requests a translation of the evidence in the language of the proceedings, the Office, in principle, will require a translation; however, in the present case, the applicant has not made such request, nor did it, for that matter, file any observations in its defence. Finally, as regards the contracts and royalties data (filed as Exhibit 5) and some other evidence filed under Exhibit 6 (e.g. photographs and articles, albeit not accompanied by an English translation, their meaning is considered evident and self-explanatory regardless of their textual components.

As the affidavits are concerned, Article 10(4) EUTMDR expressly mentions written statements referred to in Article 97(1)(f) EUTMR as admissible means of proof of use. Article 97(1)(f) EUTMR lists means of giving evidence, amongst which are sworn or affirmed written statements or other statements that have a similar effect according to the law of the State in which they have been drawn up. As far as the probative value of this kind of evidence is concerned, while such statements drawn up by the interested parties themselves or their employees are generally given less weight than independent evidence because the perception of the party involved in the dispute may be more or less affected by its personal interests in the matter, however, this does not mean that such statements do not have any probative value at all. The final outcome depends on the overall assessment of the evidence in the particular case, which, in the present case, clearly sufficiently supports the claim of reputation of the earlier mark in, at least, France.

Considering the relevant public’s familiarity with the trade mark, the Opposition Division therefore considers that the earlier mark enjoys a far reaching reputation, at least for the above mentioned awards ceremonies and events, that fall within the category of services including ‘sports competitions, organisation of sports competitions and arranging of award ceremonies’ included in Class 41 and in respect of which the earlier trade mark is registered (Cf. 17/10/2018 in T-8/17, Golden Balls Ltd. / EUIPO, EU:T:2018:692, § 94 and 97 and 30/09/2016, in R 1962/2015-1, § 42-44 where the Court even considered that the fact that the earlier mark is not used for sports activities in general is not likely to affect its reputation with regard to sports competitions, the organization of sports competitions and sports trophies included in Class 41).

b) The signs

BALLON D’OR
Earlier trade mark	Contested sign

The relevant territory is France.

The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).

The earlier mark is a word mark, consisting of the French terms ‘BALLON D’OR’, which will be understood by the relevant public as ‘golden ball’ or ‘golden balloon’. It is in any event inherently distinctive, at least as a whole, for the services at issue, as it does not directly describe a characteristic of the services nor is it otherwise devoid of distinctiveness, even if ‘BALLON’ per se may be allusive for part of the services that relate to a sport ball and even if ‘D’OR’ (i.e. ‘of gold’) may be associated with something considered to be precious, beautiful or of the most superior quality, and hence be laudatory, allusive to the quality, and thus of weaker distinctiveness. In addition, as the reputation of the earlier mark has been established, as seen above, its distinctiveness is clearly higher.

The contested sign is a figurative mark, composed of the verbal elements ‘Gold ball Rally’, depicted one above the other, in a stylised, black and white font, against the white background with an outer black bold circle (which could also be perceived as the shape of a ball).

A non-negligible part of the French-speaking consumers will understand the English words ‘Gold’ and ‘Ball’ as referring to a ‘ballon doré’ [‘a golden ball’] or ‘un ballon d’or’ or ‘en or’ [‘a ball (made) of gold’ or ‘in gold’]. The words ‘golden’ and ‘balls’ are indeed part of basic English language vocabulary known by a large part of the EU public including France (Cf. 22/06/2011, R1432/2010-1, § 21 and 16/09/2016, T-448/11, GOLDEN BALLS, § 34-37; as regards ‘Gold’, also e.g. 21/03/2011, T-372/09, GOLD MEISTER, EU:T:2011:97, § 32; 13/10/2016, R-382/2016-5, THAT’S GOLD, § 24; as regards ‘ball’ it is also very similar to its French equivalent term ‘ballon’ as well as adopted in French language in the commonly used loanword ‘football’) and as such are likely to be understood by the relevant public with even rudimentary knowledge of English (09/12/2010, T-307/09, Naturally active, EU:T:2010:509, § 26-27). Consequently, they will be understood as referring to a ‘golden ball’ or a ‘ball of gold’. The same reasoning as above applies to the distinctiveness of the term ‘gold’; in any event, ‘ball’ is arbitrary for the relevant contested services and thus normally distinctive.

The English term ‘rally’ of the contested sign will be immediately understood as a large gathering of people for some purpose, or a meeting (usually of cars or motorcycles) for a competition, race etc, also given its highly similar French equivalent term ‘rallye’. This term is thus directly descriptive of a characteristic of the services at issue (which are organisation of automobile rallies, tours and racing events); hence, it lacks distinctiveness.

Finally, the contested sign’s figurative aspects, although not devoid of distinctiveness, are not particularly striking and will, in any event, have less impact than the verbal elements. Account must be taken of the fact that when signs consist of both verbal and figurative components, in principle, the verbal component of the sign usually has a stronger impact on the consumer than the figurative component. This is because the public does not tend to analyse signs and will more easily refer to the signs in question by their verbal element than by describing their figurative elements (14/07/2005, T‑312/03, Selenium-Ace, EU:T:2005:289, § 37). In the contested sign, it will undoubtedly be the verbal component that will have more impact on consumers, who will refer to the contested application by its verbal elements rather than by describing its figurative aspects.

Visually and aurally, the signs only coincide in that they both contain the string of letters ‘BALL’, which, however is likely to perceived and pronounced differently on account of their different language of origin and position in the signs (at the beginning of the earlier mark, and in the middle of the contested sign, where it is preceded by ‘Gold’ and in a stylised (albeit not overly) typeface; also, the pronunciation of the letter string ‘BALL’ is different in the French terms ‘ballon’ and ‘football’). The signs also differ in the (sound of the) different, additional letter strings ‘-ON D’OR’ of the earlier mark and in the different (albeit weak) additional verbal elements, ‘Gold’ and ‘rally’ of the contested sign. In addition, they also differ in the figurative elements of the contested sign, albeit of less impact, as described above. Furthermore, the signs differ in their beginnings (which is generally the part that will firstly catch the consumers’ attention), in their rhythms, intonation and length.

Consequently, the Opposition Division is of the opinion that the signs are visually and aurally dissimilar.

Conceptually, there is a very weak similarity which requires a prior translation for the relevant public: account must be taken of the fact that the correct translation into English of ‘ballon d’or’ can be ‘golden ball’. Despite the use of the grammatically incorrect adjective form ‘Gold ball’ -instead of ‘Golden ball’- (as well as the non-distinctive term ‘rally’) in the contested sign, it is highly likely that the relevant average French-speaking consumers will not remember the trade marks perfectly and will not necessarily perceive the use of this grammatically incorrect form. Therefore, the signs may convey the same or at least very similar hidden meaning for a sizable part of the relevant francophone consumer with an average level of attention, although the linguistic difference (i.e. use of the translated terms, albeit in basic English understandable for a sizable part of the relevant public) is capable of impeding, at least to some degree, the immediate discovery of this.

For the sake of completeness, it is noted that the additional term ‘rally’ in the contested sign, although evoking a concept, it does not allow to create a relevant conceptual distance, as this element is non-distinctive for the contested services and can thus not indicate their commercial origin.

Taking into account that the signs have been found similar to some extent in at least one aspect of the comparison, the examination of the existence of a risk of injury will proceed.

c) The ‘link’ between the signs

As seen above, the earlier mark is reputed and the signs are similar to some extent, conceptually. In order to establish the existence of a risk of injury, it is necessary to demonstrate that, given all the relevant factors, the relevant public will establish a link (or association) between the signs. The necessity of such a ‘link’ between the conflicting marks in consumers’ minds is not explicitly mentioned in Article 8(5) EUTMR but has been confirmed by several judgments (23/10/2003, C‑408/01, Adidas, EU:C:2003:582, § 29, 31; 27/11/2008, C‑252/07, Intel, EU:C:2008:655, § 66). It is not an additional requirement but merely reflects the need to determine whether the association that the public might establish between the signs is such that either detriment or unfair advantage is likely to occur after all of the factors that are relevant to the particular case have been assessed.

Possible relevant factors for the examination of a ‘link’ include (27/11/2008, C‑252/07, Intel, EU:C:2008:655, § 42):

 the degree of similarity between the signs;

 the nature of the goods and services, including the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between those goods or services, and the relevant public;

 the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation;

 the degree of the earlier mark’s distinctive character, whether inherent or acquired through use;

 the existence of likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.

This list is not exhaustive and other criteria may be relevant depending on the particular circumstances. Moreover, the existence of a ‘link’ may be established on the basis of only some of these criteria.

The establishment of such a link, while triggered by similarity (or identity) between the signs, requires that the relevant sections of the public for each of the services covered by the trade marks in dispute are the same or overlap to some extent. In the present case, it is established that the earlier mark enjoys a very high degree of recognition for at least sport awards ceremonies. Furthermore, it is found inherently distinctive to a normal degree for these services.

The signs are similar conceptually to a very low degree as detailed above. It is possible that the relevant section of the public for the services covered by the conflicting signs is the same. Simply put, all the contested services may be directed to the same users of the opponent’s services, which may all be used in the same sport context and directed to the same average consumers interested in sport.

Nevertheless, as for the proximity of the market sectors, even if the relevant section of the public as regards the goods or services for which the conflicting marks are registered is the same or overlaps to some extent, those goods or services may be so dissimilar that the later mark is unlikely to bring the earlier mark to the mind of the relevant public (27/11/2008, C‑252/07, Intel, EU:C:2008:655, § 49).

It is in the light of the above jurisprudence that the opponent’s claim has been examined.

In the present case it cannot be excluded that such a link will exist with respect to all the contested services.

A number of factors lead to this conclusion. In addition to the proximity of the market sectors and the fact that the opponent’s earlier mark has a far-reaching reputation for sport related events and thus is bound to be known to at least part of the public to which the abovementioned contested services are directed, the contested services are also at least similar to the opponent’s services as these services, on the market, may coincide in nature, method of use, producer, relevant public and distribution channel. In addition, they may be in competition with each other. Therefore, also considering the reputation of the earlier mark, the contested sign when used in relation to these services, may bring to mind the opponent’s mark.

Considering the above, taking into account and weighing up all the relevant factors of the present case, the Opposition Division concludes that, when encountering the contested sign, the relevant consumers will be likely to associate it with the earlier sign, that is to say, establish a mental ‘link’ between the signs.

The Opposition Division also notes that the applicant has not adduced any particularities that would alter this finding.

However, although a ‘link’ between the signs is a necessary condition for further assessing whether detriment or unfair advantage are likely, the existence of such a link is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that there may be one of the forms of damage referred to in Article 8(5) EUTMR (26/09/2012, T‑301/09, Citigate, EU:T:2012:473, § 96).

d) Risk of injury

Use of the contested mark will fall under Article 8(5) EUTMR when any of the following situations arise:

 it takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark;

 it is detrimental to the repute of the earlier mark;

 it is detrimental to the distinctive character of the earlier mark.

Although detriment or unfair advantage may be only potential in opposition proceedings, a mere possibility is not sufficient for Article 8(5) EUTMR to be applicable. While the proprietor of the earlier mark is not required to demonstrate actual and present harm to its mark, it must ‘adduce prima facie evidence of a future risk, which is not hypothetical, of unfair advantage or detriment’ (06/07/2012, T‑60/10, Royal Shakespeare, EU:T:2012:348, § 53).

It follows that the opponent must establish that detriment or unfair advantage is probable, in the sense that it is foreseeable in the ordinary course of events. For that purpose, the opponent should file evidence, or at least put forward a coherent line of argument demonstrating what the detriment or unfair advantage would consist of and how it would occur, that could lead to the prima facie conclusion that such an event is indeed likely in the ordinary course of events.

The opponent claims, inter alia, that in view of the exceptionally high reputation of the earlier BALLON D’OR trade mark, the probability of a risk of unfair advantage is obvious and that given the significant and consistent marketing efforts and investments which have been made over the years to promote the BALLON D’OR trade mark across Europe, including France, the marketing of services that are at least similar under the contested sign would be very much facilitated by establishing a link with the reputed BALLON D’OR mark. In other words, the opponent claims amongst others that use of the contested sign would take unfair advantage of the repute of the earlier trade mark.

Unfair advantage (free-riding)

Unfair advantage in the context of Article 8(5) EUTMR covers cases where there is clear exploitation and ‘free‑riding on the coat‑tails’ of a famous mark or an attempt to trade upon its reputation. In other words, there is a risk that the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the goods and services covered by the contested sign, with the result that the marketing of those goods and services is made easier by their association with the earlier mark with a reputation (06/07/2012, T‑60/10, Royal Shakespeare, EU:T:2012:348, § 48; 22/03/2007, T‑215/03, Vips, EU:T:2007:93, § 40).

According to the Court of Justice of the European Union

… as regards injury consisting of unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, in so far as what is prohibited is the drawing of benefit from that mark by the proprietor of the later mark, the existence of such injury must be assessed by reference to average consumers of the goods or services for which the later mark is registered, who are reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.

(27/11/2008, C‑252/07, Intel, EU:C:2008:655, § 36.)

To sum up, the earlier mark’s reputed services share a sufficiently close connection with the above listed contested services in Class 41.

In view of the far-reaching reputation of the earlier mark and also considering the similarities between the signs, it is considered that the lower degree of closeness between the signs is in any event sufficient to trigger a mental link and remind of the earlier mark since sport awards and event organising companies, as the opponent’s one, have rather diversified profiles and may operate on several interconnected markets.

It is to be noted that the proprietor of the earlier mark only needs to demonstrate prima facie evidence of a future risk, which is not hypothetical, of unfair advantage or detriment (25/05/2005, T 67/04, Spa-Finders, EU:T:2005:179, § 40).

It must be also recalled that the protection under Article 8(5) EUTMR extends to all cases where the use of the contested sign applied for is likely to have an adverse effect on the earlier mark, in the sense that it is, inter alia, likely to result in misappropriation of the powers of attraction or exploitation of the earlier mark’s image and prestige (unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute).

Furthermore, taking unfair advantage does not necessarily require a deliberate intention to exploit the goodwill attached to someone else’s trade mark. The concept of taking unfair advantage ‘concerns the risk that the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods is made easier by that association with the earlier mark with a reputation’ (19/06/2008, T-93/06, Mineral Spa, EU:T:2008:215, § 40; 22/03/2007, T-215/03, Vips, EU:T:2007:93, § 40; 30/01/2008, T-128/06, Camelo, EU:T:2008:22, § 46).

Therefore, taking into account all the relevant factors listed above, it cannot be ruled out that through the use of the contested sign, the applicant may benefit from the attractiveness of the earlier mark and exploit the marketing effort expended by the opponent in order to develop its brand in such way building-up an image , for which it did not pay any financial compensation.

On the basis of the above, the Opposition Division concludes that the contested sign is likely to take unfair advantage of the repute of the earlier trade mark in relation to all the services at issue.

Other types of injury

The opponent also argues that use of the contested sign would be detrimental to the distinctive character of the earlier trade mark.

As seen above, the existence of a risk of injury is an essential condition for Article 8(5) EUTMR to apply. The risk of injury may be of three different types. For an opposition to be well founded in this respect it is sufficient if only one of these types is found to exist. In the present case, as seen above, the Opposition Division has already concluded that the contested sign would take unfair advantage of the repute of the earlier trade mark. It follows that there is no need to examine whether other types also apply.

e) Conclusion

Considering all the above, the opposition is well founded under Article 8(5) EUTMR. Therefore, the opposed sign must be rejected for all the contested services.

Given that the opposition is entirely successful under Article 8(5) EUTMR, it is not necessary to examine the remaining ground and earlier m on which the opposition was based.

COSTS

According to Article 109(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party.

Since the applicant is the losing party, it must bear the opposition fee as well as the costs incurred by the opponent in the course of these proceedings.

According to Article 109(1) and (7) EUTMR and Article 18(1)(c)(i) EUTMIR (former Rule 94(3) and (6) and Rule 94(7)(d)(i) EUTMIR, in force before 01/10/2017), the costs to be paid to the opponent are the opposition fee and the costs of representation, which are to be fixed on the basis of the maximum rate set therein.

The Opposition Division

Justyna GBYL

Edith Elisabeth VAN DEN EEDE

Francesca CANGERI

According to Article 67 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 68 EUTMR, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds for appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be deemed to have been filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.