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OPPOSITION DIVISION |
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OPPOSITION No B 3 050 565
Saldon Products Limited, 1st floor, Tamlite Emergency, Rear of Unit 48B Pipers Road, Park Farm Industrial Estate, B98 0HU Redditch, United Kingdom (opponent), represented by Marks & Clerk LLP, Alpha Tower Suffolk Street Queensway, B1 1TT Birmingham, United Kingdom (professional representative)
a g a i n s t
Mobiled V.O.F., Dorpenbaan 19, 5121 DE Rijen, Netherlands (applicant), represented by Merk-Echt B.V., Keizerstraat 7, 4811 HL Breda, Netherlands (professional representative).
On 17/07/2019, the Opposition Division takes the following
DECISION:
1. Opposition No B 3 050 565 is rejected in its entirety.
2. The opponent bears the costs, fixed at EUR 300.
REASONS
The opponent filed an opposition against some of the goods and services of European Union trade mark application No 17 574 419 ‘M-LED’, namely against some of the goods and services in Classes 9, 11 and 35. The opposition is based on United Kingdom trade mark registration No 3 033 348 ‘MODLED’, for which the opponent claimed Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) EUTMR, and on the non-registered trade marks used in the course of trade ‘MODLED’ and ‘M-LED’, for which the opponent invoked Article 8(4) EUTMR.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION — ARTICLE 8(1)(b) EUTMR
A likelihood of confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. Whether a likelihood of confusion exists depends on the appreciation in a global assessment of several factors, which are interdependent. These factors include the similarity of the signs, the similarity of the goods and services, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the distinctive and dominant elements of the conflicting signs, and the relevant public.
a) The goods
The goods on which the opposition is based are the following:
Class 9: Light-emitting diodes [LED].
Class 11: Lighting apparatus; lighting; lighting fixtures for commercial use; lighting fittings.
The contested goods and services are the following:
Class 9: Light-emitting diodes; blinkers (signalling lights); luminous beacons, signs and panels; emergency warning lights; emergency lighting for vehicles; signal lighting.
Class 11: Lighting apparatus, equipment, fixtures, elements, installations and articles; lights; Indoor and outdoor lighting; light objects; led illuminators, including led spotlights, led panels and led bars; broad-beam headlights and main beam headlamps; work lamps ;battery lamps ;beacons; electric torches; led flashlights; head torches; vehicle lighting and lighting reflectors, including headlights, taillights, flashing lights, direction indicators, brake lights, contour lights, marker lights, hazard lights, dashboard lamp bulbs, interior lighting and number plate lights; flashlights and light bars for vehicles; clamps, mounts, brackets and supports for mounting lights, including on vehicles; security lighting; parts for the aforesaid goods included in this class.
Class 35: Business mediation in the purchase and sale, import and export, and wholesaling and retailing of leds, parts for the aforesaid goods; business mediation in the purchase and sale, import and export, and wholesaling and retailing of blinkers (signalling lights), luminous beacons, signs and panels, emergency warning lamps, emergency lighting for vehicles, safety lighting, signal lighting, reflective strips, parts for the aforesaid goods; business mediation in the purchase and sale, import and export, and wholesaling and retailing of lighting apparatus, devices, fixtures, elements, installations and articles, lamps, indoor and outdoor lighting, luminous objects, including led spotlights, led panels and led bars, wide-beam and high-beam headlights, work lights, battery-powered lights, beacons, flashlights, led flashlights, head lamps, parts for the aforesaid goods; business mediation in the purchase and sale, import and export, and wholesaling and retailing of lighting and light reflectors for vehicles, including headlights, rear lights, blinkers (signalling lights), direction indicators, brake lights, contour lights, marker lights, hazard lights, dashboard lights, interior lighting and number plate lights, parts for the aforesaid goods; business mediation in the purchase and sale, import and export, and wholesaling and retailing of flashlights and light bars for vehicles, clamps, mounts, brackets and supports for mounting lights, including on vehicles, parts for the aforesaid goods; consultancy and information regarding the aforesaid services; the aforesaid services also provided via electronic networks, such as the internet.
Some of the contested goods and services are identical or similar to the goods on which the opposition is based. For reasons of procedural economy, the Opposition Division will not undertake a full comparison of the goods and services listed above. The examination of the opposition will proceed as if all the contested goods and services were identical to those of the earlier mark which, for the opponent, is the best light in which the opposition can be examined.
b) Relevant public — degree of attention
The average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s degree of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.
In the present case, the goods and services assumed to be identical are directed at the public at large as well as business customers with specific professional knowledge or expertise.
The degree of attention may vary from average to higher than average, depending on the specialised nature of the goods and services.
c) The signs
MODLED
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M-LED
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Earlier trade mark |
Contested sign |
The relevant territory is the United Kingdom.
The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).
Although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, they will break it down into elements which, for them, suggest a specific meaning or which resemble words known to them (13/02/2007, T‑256/04, Respicur, EU:T:2007:46, § 57).
Part of the public will perceive the earlier trade mark ‘MODLED’ as meaningless and, therefore, distinctive. Conversely — and especially taking the abovementioned principle into account — it cannot be excluded that another part of the public might understand the earlier mark as being formed by the components ‘MOD’ and ‘LED’. In this circumstance, the element ‘MOD’ will easily be grasped as the abbreviation of the word ‘modular’ (i.e. ‘something that can be arranged or fitted together in a variety of ways’) whereas ‘LED’ will be understood as ‘light-emitting diode’. It follows that in this event the component ‘MOD’ is weak in relation to all the relevant goods and services (as it can evoke one of the functions of the goods sold or traded) and the element ‘LED’ is non-distinctive, as it merely describes the kind of goods sold / traded.
As far as the contested sign is concerned, part of the public will perceive the initial letter ‘M-’ as such, which is distinctive. Conversely, another part of the public will understand this element as a reference to mobile-communications technology. In this circumstance, the element ‘M-’ also retains a weak degree of distinctiveness since it will merely indicate that the relevant goods concern / can function by means of mobile technology (e.g. lighting apparatus that can be controlled by a mobile application on a smartphone) or the field of business of the relevant services (e.g. relating to mobile lighting technologies). Finally, the element ‘LED’ — detached by the hyphen from the initial letter ‘M’ — will be perceived by the relevant public with the same meaning as outlined above and it is, therefore, non‑distinctive.
Visually, the signs coincide in the letters ‘M*LED’. However, they differ in the earlier mark’s second and third letters ‘OD’ and in the contested sign’s hyphen between the letters ‘M’ and ‘L’. In this regard it must be stressed that the comparison of signs must be based on the overall impression given by the marks. Specifically, the length of signs may influence the effect of the differences between them. In principle, the shorter a sign, the more easily the public is able to perceive all its single elements.
Taking this principle into account, it must be concluded that the signs are visually similar only to a below average degree since the relative brevity of the contested sign (four letters) plays a significant role in differentiating it from the earlier mark (six letters, two of which are not present in the contested sign).
Aurally, the pronunciation of the signs coincides in the sound of their first letter, ‘M’, and the syllable ‘LED’. However, they differ in the sound of the earlier mark’s second and third letters, ‘OD’, and in the contested sign’s pause between the letter ‘M’ and ‘L’, due to the presence of the hyphen. Specifically, the relevant public will pronounce the earlier mark as ‘MO / DLED’ or ‘MOD / LED’ whereas the contested application as ‘M / LED’. Additionally, the earlier sign’s first vowel, ‘O’, and second consonant ‘D’ imply significant aural differences from the contested sign.
Therefore, the signs are aurally similar to a low degree.
Conceptually, part of the public will perceive the earlier trade mark as meaningless and the contested sign only as having the meaning of the letter ‘M’ and of the abbreviation ‘LED’. Although the contested sign’s element ‘LED’ will evoke a concept that will not be grasped in the earlier mark, this is not sufficient to establish any conceptual difference, as this element is non-distinctive and cannot indicate the commercial origin. However, since the letter ‘M’ in the contested trade mark will be perceived as such, whereas the earlier mark will not be associated with any meaning, the signs are not conceptually similar.
Another part of the public will perceive the earlier trade mark’s initial verbal element ‘MOD’ and the contested sign’s first letter ‘M’ with the meanings explained above. As for this part of the public the signs will be associated with dissimilar meanings, the signs are also not conceptually not similar. In this regard, it must be stressed that this part of the public will also perceive the meaning of the word ‘LED’ in both signs. However, the overlap in this element it is not sufficient to establish any conceptual similarity as it is non-distinctive and cannot indicate the commercial origin.
As the signs have been found similar in at least one aspect of the comparison, the examination of likelihood of confusion will proceed.
d) Distinctiveness of the earlier mark
The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.
According to the opponent, the earlier trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom in connection with all the goods for which it is registered.
This claim must be properly considered given that the distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark must be taken into account in the assessment of likelihood of confusion. Indeed, the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, and therefore marks with a highly distinctive character because of the recognition they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character (29/09/1998, C‑39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 18).
The opponent submitted the following evidence.
Exhibit 1: an extract dated 13/08/2018 from Companies House certifying that the company ‘SALDON PRODUCTS LIMITED’ was incorporated on 26/05/1951.
Exhibit 2: extracts from the audited financial statements of the opponent for the years 2015 - 2017 displaying turnovers of approximately GBP 40 million.
Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8: a series of website printouts, leaflets and catalogues of two of the opponent’s distributors displaying several LED products bearing, inter alia, the trade mark ‘MODLED’.
Exhibit 6: several printouts referring to articles about the opponent’s products. Notably, the opponent submitted:
o an article dated 12/02/2016 about a product bearing the mark ‘MODLED LG PRO’ stating, inter alia, that it represents the cutting edge of home-grown lighting research and development.
o an undated article of the magazine PROFESSIONAL ELECTRICIAN & INSTALLER reporting, inter alia, that the company Thyssenkrupp installed Tamlite ‘MODLED LG PRO’ lamps.
o an article dated 17/06/2016 stating, inter alia, that the opponent’s company has supplied over 300 ‘MODLED’ low energy LED recessed modular panels to four North Yorkshire County Council schools.
o an article dated 13/09/2016 stating, inter alia, that ‘MODLED PRO’ products can be found in schools and colleges throughout the UK.
o an article dated 13/08/2018 reporting that the laboratory areas of the Princess Elizabeth Hospital were fitted with ‘MODLED’ solutions.
o an undated article reporting that MODLED LG PRO’ panels were installed in Hastings High School.
o two articles dated 31/08/2014 and 04/06/2018 respectively, mentioning how LED products bearing the opponent’s trade mark ‘MODLED’ and ‘MODLED LG PRO’ were installed in schools or enterprises in the UK.
Having examined the material listed above, the Opposition Division concludes that the evidence submitted by the opponent does not demonstrate that the earlier trade mark acquired a high degree of distinctiveness through its use.
Enhanced distinctiveness requires recognition of the mark by a significant part of the relevant public. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including whether or not it contains an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public that, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (22/06/1999, C‑342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 22).
In the present case, an overall assessment of the evidence submitted, despite showing some use of the trade mark ‘MODLED’ or ‘MODLED LG PRO’ mainly in relation to LED products, does not allow for any conclusions to be drawn on the degree of recognition of the trade mark by the relevant public.
For example, the statement of income (Exhibit 2) refers to the general turnover made by the opponent’s company, but it does not display any specific data concerning the sales figures generated by the products bearing the trade mark ‘MODLED’.
Additionally, the articles submitted (Exhibit 6) merely report that the opponent’s ‘MODLED’ and ‘MODLED LG PRO’ products were used in the lighting systems of several establishments in the United Kingdom. However, no direct or indirect indication can be inferred from these articles concerning the degree of knowledge of the mark, the market share, or the position it occupies in the market in relation to the competitors’ goods.
The same reasoning applies to the evidence as per Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. These pieces of evidence can contribute to showing the use of the opponent’s trade mark, as they display, inter alia, the sign ‘MODLED’ in relation to some LED products. However, this evidence does not provide any information on the degree of recognition of the trade mark by the relevant public. The information contained in Exhibit 1 only reports on the date of incorporation of the opponent’s company without making reference to the sign for which the enhanced distinctiveness is claimed.
In this regard, it must be stressed that recognition of the trade mark is extremely important for proving enhanced distinctiveness as a result of intensive use or reputation. While there are many competitors in the marketplace, only a small number of them enjoy a substantial level of recognition by the relevant consumers. Consequently, the threshold of enhanced distinctiveness claimed by the opponent may be considered reached only when solid proof that the mark in question is known by a relevant part of the public has been submitted.
It follows that the opponent has failed to submit solid and objective evidence that would allow the Opposition Division to conclude, without resorting to probabilities and suppositions, that the trade mark ‘MODLED’ is widely recognised by a significant part of the relevant public.
Consequently, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark will rest on its distinctiveness per se. Considering what has been stated above in section c) of this decision, for the part of the public that will derive a meaning from the sign’s components ‘MOD’ and ‘LED’, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as low for all the goods in question. Conversely, the mark has a normal degree of distinctiveness for the remaining part of the public for which the sign is meaningless.
e) Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion
The appreciation of likelihood of confusion on the part of the public depends, inter alia, on the recognition of the earlier mark on the market, the association which can be made with the registered mark, the degree of similarity between the marks and between the goods or services identified. It must be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case (22/06/1999, C‑342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 18; 11/11/1997, C‑251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 22).
In the present case, the goods and services have been assumed to be identical. They target both the general and professional public who will pay a degree of attention that can vary from average to higher than average.
The signs in conflict are visually similar to a below average degree, aurally similar to a low degree and conceptually not similar. The distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark is low for part of the public while it has a normal degree of distinctiveness for another part of the public.
In relation to the part of the public for which the earlier mark ‘MODLED’ is meaningless while the contested sign ‘M-LED’ will be perceived as only evoking the meaning of the letter ‘M’ and the non-distinctive meaning of LED, the Opposition Division concludes that there is no likelihood of confusion. Indeed, the visual and aural differences caused by the earlier trade mark’s second and third letters ‘OD’ and the fact that the earlier mark will be perceived as a single word whereas the contested sign as two distinct verbal elements separated by an hyphen (the first, ‘M’, distinctive as perceived as such whereas the second, ‘LED’, non-distinctive) are factors capable of maintaining a sufficient distance between the overall impressions given by the signs.
Additionally, for the part of the public that would perceive both the signs as evoking a meaning, the finding of no likelihood of confusion is, a fortiori, applicable. Where marks share an element with no distinctiveness — in this case ‘LED’ — the assessment will focus on the impact of the non-coinciding components on the overall impression of the marks. In this case, the most distinctive parts of the signs (i.e. ‘MOD’ in the earlier trade mark and ‘M’ in the contested application, considered only weak in relation to the relevant goods and services) are capable of producing a different overall impression and of differentiating the signs conceptually, given the abovementioned meanings that these elements convey.
For these reasons, it is not plausible that the relevant consumer, who is considered reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, might believe that the services assumed to be identical come from the same undertaking or economically linked undertakings.
Considering all the above, even assuming that the goods and services are identical there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Therefore, the opposition must be rejected.
REPUTATION — ARTICLE 8(5) EUTMR
According to Article 8(5) EUTMR, upon opposition by the proprietor of a registered earlier trade mark within the meaning of Article 8(2) EUTMR, the contested trade mark will not be registered where it is identical with, or similar to, an earlier trade mark, irrespective of whether the goods or services for which it is applied are identical with, similar to or not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where, in the case of an earlier European Union trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Union or, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use without due cause of the contested trade mark would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.
Therefore, the grounds for refusal of Article 8(5) EUTMR are only applicable when the following conditions are met.
The signs must be either identical or similar.
The opponent’s trade mark must have a reputation. The reputation must also be prior to the filing of the contested trade mark; it must exist in the territory concerned and for the goods and/or services on which the opposition is based.
Risk of injury: use of the contested trade mark would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark.
The abovementioned requirements are cumulative and, therefore, the absence of any one of them will lead to the rejection of the opposition under Article 8(5) EUTMR (16/12/2010, T‑345/08 & T‑357/08, Botolist / Botocyl, EU:T:2010:529, § 41). However, the fulfilment of all the abovementioned conditions may not be sufficient. The opposition may still fail if the applicant establishes due cause for the use of the contested trade mark.
In the present case, the applicant did not claim to have due cause for using the contested mark. Therefore, in the absence of any indications to the contrary, it must be assumed that no due cause exists.
Reputation of the earlier trade mark
The evidence submitted by the opponent to prove the reputation and highly distinctive character of the earlier trade mark has already been examined above under the grounds of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR. Reference is made to those findings, which are equally valid for Article 8(5) EUTMR.
The Opposition Division finds that the evidence submitted by the opponent does not demonstrate that the earlier trade mark acquired a reputation.
As already outlined above, despite showing some use of the trade mark, the evidence provides little information on the extent of such use. The evidence does not provide any indication of the degree of recognition of the trade mark by the relevant public. Furthermore, the evidence does not indicate the sales volumes, the market share of the trade mark or the extent to which the trade mark has been promoted. As a result, the evidence does not show the degree of recognition of the trade mark by the relevant public. Under these circumstances, the Opposition Division concludes that the opponent failed to prove that its trade mark has a reputation.
As seen above, it is a requirement for the opposition to be successful under Article 8(5) EUTMR that the earlier trade mark has a reputation. Since it has not been established that the earlier trade mark has a reputation, one of the necessary conditions contained in Article 8(5) EUTMR is not fulfilled, and the opposition must be rejected.
NON‑REGISTERED MARK OR ANOTHER SIGN USED IN THE COURSE OF TRADE — ARTICLE 8(4) EUTMR
According to Article 8(4) EUTMR, upon opposition by the proprietor of a non‑registered trade mark or of another sign used in the course of trade of more than mere local significance, the trade mark applied for will not be registered where and to the extent that, pursuant to the Union legislation or the law of the Member State governing that sign:
(a) rights to that sign were acquired prior to the date of application for registration of the European Union trade mark, or the date of the priority claimed for the application for registration of the European Union trade mark;
(b) that sign confers on its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark.
Therefore, the grounds of refusal of Article 8(4) EUTMR are subject to the following requirements:
the earlier sign must have been used in the course of trade of more than local significance prior to the filing of the contested trade mark;
pursuant to the law governing it, prior to the filing of the contested trade mark, the opponent acquired rights to the sign on which the opposition is based, including the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark;
the conditions under which the use of a subsequent trade mark may be prohibited are fulfilled in respect of the contested trade mark.
These conditions are cumulative. Therefore, where a sign does not satisfy one of those conditions, the opposition based on a non‑registered trade mark or other signs used in the course of trade within the meaning of Article 8(4) EUTMR cannot succeed.
a) The right under the applicable law
According to Article 95(1) EUTMR, the Office will examine the facts of its own motion in proceedings before it; however, in proceedings relating to relative grounds for refusal of registration, the Office will restrict this examination to the facts, evidence and arguments submitted by the parties and the relief sought.
According to Article 7(2)(d) EUTMDR, if the opposition is based on an earlier right within the meaning of Article 8(4) EUTMR, the opposing party must provide, inter alia, evidence of its acquisition, continued existence and scope of protection, including where the earlier right is invoked pursuant to the law of a Member State, a clear identification of the content of the national law relied upon by adducing publications of the relevant provisions or jurisprudence.
Therefore, the onus is on the opponent to submit all the information necessary for the decision, including identifying the applicable law and providing all the necessary information for its sound application. According to case-law, it is up to the opponent ‘… to provide OHIM not only with particulars showing that he satisfies the necessary conditions, in accordance with the national law of which he is seeking application … but also particulars establishing the content of that law’ (05/07/2011, C‑263/09 P, Elio Fiorucci, EU:C:2011:452, § 50).
The information on the applicable law must allow the Office to understand and apply the content of that law, the conditions for obtaining protection and the scope of this protection, and allow the applicant to exercise the right of defence.
As regards the provisions of the applicable law, the opponent must provide a clear identification of the content of the national law relied upon by adducing publications of the relevant provisions or jurisprudence (Article 7(2)(d) EUTMDR). The opponent must provide the reference to the relevant legal provision (Article number and the number and title of the law) and the content (text) of the legal provision by adducing publications of the relevant provisions or jurisprudence (e.g. excerpts from an official journal, a legal commentary, legal encyclopaedias or court decisions). If the relevant provision refers to a further provision of law, this must also be provided to enable the applicant and the Office to understand the full meaning of the provision invoked and to determine the possible relevance of this further provision. Where the evidence concerning the content of the relevant national law is accessible online from a source recognised by the Office, the opponent may provide such evidence by making a reference to that source (Article 7(3) EUTMDR).
According to Article 7(4) EUTMDR, any provisions of the applicable national law governing the acquisition of rights and their scope of protection as referred to in Article 7(2)(d) EUTMDR, including evidence accessible online as referred to in Article 7(3) EUTMDR must be in the language of the proceedings or accompanied by a translation into that language. The translation must be submitted by the opposing party of its own motion within the time limit specified for submitting the original document.
Furthermore, the opponent must submit appropriate evidence of fulfilment of the conditions of acquisition and of the scope of protection of the right invoked, as well as evidence that the conditions of protection vis-à-vis the contested mark have actually been met. In particular, it must put forward a cogent line of argument as to why use of the contested mark would be successfully prevented under the applicable law.
In the present case, the opponent did not submit any information on the legal protection granted to the type of trade signs invoked within the time limit set by the Office for substantiate the opposition (i.e. 12/12/2018), namely the earlier non-registered trade marks used in the course of trade ‘M-LED’ and ‘MODLED’. The opponent did not submit any information on the possible content of the rights invoked or the conditions to be fulfilled for the opponent to be able to prohibit the use of the contested trade mark under the laws in each of the Member States mentioned by the opponent.
Therefore, the opposition is not well founded under Article 8(4) EUTMR.
COSTS
According to Article 109(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party.
Since the opponent is the losing party, it must bear the costs incurred by the applicant in the course of these proceedings.
According to Article 109(7) EUTMR and Article 18(1)(c)(i) EUTMIR (former Rule 94(3) and Rule 94(7)(d)(ii) EUTMIR, in force before 01/10/2017), the costs to be paid to the applicant are the costs of representation, which are to be fixed on the basis of the maximum rate set therein.
The Opposition Division
Marianna KONDAS
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Aldo BLASI |
Marta GARCÍA COLLADO
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According to Article 67 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 68 EUTMR, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds for appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be deemed to have been filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.